This study empirically examines the effect of foreign exchange (FX) market liquidity risk and volatility on the excess returns of currency carry trades. In contrast to the existent literature, we construct an alternative proxy of liquidity risk -violations of no arbitrage bounds in the forward and currency swap markets. We also use volatility smile data to capture FX-market specific volatility. The sample data cover periods both before and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Both proxies are significant in explaining the abnormal returns of carry trades, particularly after the GFC. Our findings provide substantial evidence that uncovered interest parity (UIP) puzzle can be resolved after controlling for liquidity risk and market volatility.
Introduction and Motivation

Introduction
This paper empirically tests the effect of liquidity risk and volatility in the FX market on the performance of currency carry trades. In a carry trade investors borrow funds in a low-yield currency (funding currency) and lend the funds in a high-yield currency (investment currency) to gain the interest rate differential between the two currencies. The uncovered interest parity (UIP) predicts that the carry should be exactly offset by the depreciation of the investment currency. If UIP holds in practice, carry trades should have zero return. In practice, UIP often fails and investment currencies have been found to actually appreciate on average against funding currencies, this has been termed the UIP puzzle. The failure of UIP has also been referred to as the "forward discount puzzle" (Fama, 1984) . The UIP puzzle is the reason that carry trades are historically profitable with high Sharpe ratios (Burnside et al., 2011) . Brunnermeier et al. (2008) employ a model with funding liquidity risk to approach the UIP puzzle by studying carry trade performance. In this model carry trades tend to be unwound and incur losses when traders' funding constraints become binding. Therefore proxies for liquidity risk should be significant in explaining carry trade excess returns. These findings provide support for the theoretical liquidity model developed in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) . A key result is that after controlling for liquidity risk proxies, the interest rate differential is not significant in predicting carry returns, which points to a potential resolution of the UIP puzzle. However, as criticized in Burnside (2008) , the link between the theoretical liquidity model and empirical findings is not sufficiently strong. In particular, the liquidity measures are in general insignificant or marginally significant. Nevertheless Brunnermeier et al. (2008) offers an alternative approach to explaining the UIP puzzle.
Motivation
We propose that the liquidity measures employed by Brunnermeier et al. (2008) , VIX and the TED spread, may not well proxy FX market liquidity risk. Firstly, VIX, which is the implied volatility index for stock options, is not directly related to the FX market. Hence VIX is not an ideal measure of FX market liquidity risk. Secondly, TED spread, the difference between 3-month Eurodollar LIBOR 1 rate and 3-month Treasury-bill rate, is also not specific to the FX market. We conjecture that these proxies may have caused the lack of statistical significance. We therefore are motivated to identify alternative proxies of FX market liquidity risk to tackle the UIP puzzle. In addition, we build upon the theoretical liquidity model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and allow for the effect of market volatility.
We develop an FX market specific proxy for liquidity risk -violations of no arbitrage bounds in the forward and currency swap markets, which measures market expectation of future liquidity risk. Since the GFC, cross currency basis swaps (hereafter 'currency swap') have been quoted with substantially larger basis spreads than before. A currency swap contract exchanges floating interest rates of two different currencies at each tenor of the swap term, notional amounts are also exchanged based upon the spot exchange rate at initiation. By the no-arbitrage pricing principle, two floating rates should trade at par and the basis spread should be zero (Hull, 2008) . In practice, a basis is often added to the floating rate (usually with LIBOR as the reference rate) of the left-hand side (LHS) currency. For instance, from the late 1990s until August 2007, the basis of the one-year EUR/USD swap ranged from 0 to 2.5 basis points (Baba et al., 2008) . However, since the end of August 2007, the basis added to 3-month EURIBOR 2 turned significantly negative. From the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 to February 2010, the average basis was minus 34 basis points (Source: Bloomberg). This means that USD borrowers pay the 3-month USD LIBOR flat but receive 3-month EURIBOR minus 34 basis points.
It has been observed in the literature that there is a shortage of USD liquidity in the global banking industry and the USD funding gap is especially large for European banks. Fender and McGuire (2010) and McGuire and Peter (2009) note that European banks' total USD-denominated assets were more than 800 billion by mid-2007. European banks have traditionally used shortterm USD borrowing to fund long-term assets. Since the GFC, it became 1 London Interbank Offered Rate is the rate at which banks borrow unsecured funds in the London interbank lending market. Source: www.bbalibor.com 2 The unsecured borrowing rate for Eurozone banks in the Euro interbank market.
increasingly difficult to borrow USD in the unsecured interbank market. European banks relied more on the swap market and there was a huge demand for USD. However, the demand of USD from European banks is not matched by the demand of EUR from US counterparts. Due to the heightened liquidity risk of USD, European banks had to pay a price for the demand and the price was reflected in the large and negative basis added to EURIBOR. Although Japanese banks had smaller USD funding gap than European banks, the basis of JPY/USD currency swap also turned negative. There is anecdotal evidence that non-Japanese banks raised funds in JPY and swapped into USD. Hence the relative demand of USD over JPY may also have dislocated during the crisis. To provide more liquidity of USD, the US Federal Reserve established swap lines with major central banks, including ECB, SNB, BoE and BoJ 3 (Baba and Packer, 2009 ).
The basis spreads prior to the crisis were small and arbitrage opportunities exploiting the spreads could be largely canceled by transaction costs.
From an arbitrageur's point of view, there are two main transaction costs in currency swaps: the spread of LIBOR-LIBID 4 and the bid-offer spread of the forward exchange rate. An arbitrageur in the interbank market has to pay LIBOR when borrowing funds but only gets LIBID when lending funds. The arbitrageur also must pay the offer price of the forward exchange rate when buying foreign currency but can only sell at the bid price. If spreads in interest rates and forward exchange rates are sufficient to cancel the arbitrage profit, the basis in currency swaps should be bounded by some function of interest rates and forward rates. We include transaction costs and derive bounds for the forward rates and currency swap basis rates, which should eliminate arbitrage opportunities in practice. By construction, we propose that this proxy incorporates both market liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk. Market liquidity risk is captured by transaction costs, i.e. bid-ask spreads, whereas funding liquidity risk is proxied by the magnitude of violations of the no-arbitrage bounds. In this study we specifically examine if this alternative liquidity proxy can better explain the UIP puzzle by testing its effect on carry trade excess returns.
To allow for the effect of volatility specific to the FX market, we use volatility smile data from the FX option market. Volatility smile information represents practitioners' views of future volatility of the underlying exchange rate until the option maturity. We propose that this proxy should have a significant effect on explaining exchange rate movement and hence carry trade return.
Our sample data cover periods both before and after the GFC because both liquidity risk and market volatility have substantially heightened since the GFC. It is thus interesting to investigate if there are structural breaks in the effects of our proposed proxies. Econometric test results demonstrate that both proxies have significant effects on carry trade performance, particularly after the GFC. Furthermore, the interest-rate differential is not significant in predicting carry trade returns after controlling for volatility and liquidity, hence providing a potential resolution of the UIP puzzle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 describes the data and methodologies used for our econometric tests. Section 4 presents and analyzes results and section 5 concludes.
Review of Related Literature
The UIP puzzle is among the most prominent puzzles in international economics and finance, see Engle (1996) for a comprehensive survey. Original works on the failure of UIP date back to Hansen and Hodrick (1980) , who reject the FX market efficiency hypothesis that speculations in the FX forward market should have zero return. Meese and Rogoff (1983) find that exchange rates can be modelled by a "random walk" and investors are able to exploit interest rate differentials between currencies. Fama (1984) labels the failure of UIP as "forward discount puzzle".
Among more recent works, Chinn and Meredith (2004) find that UIP fails at short-run horizons but recovers at long-run horizons and they attribute the failure of UIP to the interaction of random FX market shocks with endogenous monetary policy reactions. Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) assert that conditional upon the interest-rate differential, aggregate consumption growth risk is useful in explaining the UIP puzzle. Burnside (2007) Among related studies, Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010) use a factor model which captures measures of market volatility and liquidity to study safe haven properties of high-frequency exchange rates. The proxies for volatility are realized exchange rate volatility and VIX. The TED spread is used to measure liquidity. The FX realized volatility is found to be significant in affecting the excess return of all exchange rates in the sample, while VIX is only significant for JPY/USD. The TED spread is not significant for any of the exchange rates. Christiansen et al. (2011) employ a similar factor model to study the risk exposure of carry trade returns. The risk exposures are allowed to be regime-dependent to account for FX time-varying risk premia. As state variables, FX market volatility and TED spread are found to be more significant than VIX and FX market liquidity, which is measured by bid-ask spreads.
Data and Empirical Strategies
Data Description
We collect daily data on four major currencies: USD, EUR, JPY and AUD. The sample period is from January 3, 2006 to August 12, 2011, covering periods both before and after the GFC.
Spot and Forward Exchange Rates
We adopt the Foreign-Domestic (FOR-DOM) quotation style and use USD as the foreign currency and the other three respectively as the domestic currency. For instance, the USD-EUR spot rate is the number of units of EUR for one unit of USD. The data source is Bloomberg. Excluding missing data, there are 1419 trading days during this period. We collect the spot rate and 1-day, 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year, 5-year forward rates. Because this study explicitly examines the effect of transaction costs, we include the mid, bid and offer rate.
LIBOR/LIBID and Interest Rate Swap (IRS) Rates
We collect USD LIBOR/ LIBID, JPY LIBOR/ LIBID, EURIBOR/EURIBID (source: Bloomberg) and AUD Bank Bill Bid and Offer Rates (source: Reserve Bank of Australia). These rates are selected because they represent the borrowing and lending costs for an arbitrageur in each currency. They are also the references rates used in currency swaps. We use Bank Bill rates to proxy AUD Bank Bill Swap rate (BBSW) 6 , which is the reference rate used in AUD currency swaps.
We need IRS rates for two purposes. Firstly, LIBOR/LIBID rates have maturities only out to 12 months. Because LIBOR is often used as the reference rate in an IRS, IRS rates can be used as proxies to extend the LIBOR zero curve beyond 12-month maturity. Secondly, in deriving the bounds for the basis of currency swaps, we eliminate the uncertain cash flow risk by entering an IRS. We use the IRS bid rate to approximate LIBID and the ask rate to approximate LIBOR. IRS data are from Bloomberg.
6 BBSW data are not available for all maturities and on all trading days. Based upon available BBSW data, we computed the error of using Bank Bill rates to approximate. The average error is 0.3 basis points for 1-month maturity and 0.1 basis points for 3-month rates. The errors are sufficiently small.
We obtain daily data of overnight (O/N), 1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 12-month USD LIBOR/ LIBID, JPY LIBOR/ LIBID and EURIBOR/EURIBID. AUD Bank Bill bid and offer rates are only available for O/N, 1-month, 3-month and 6-month, hence we use one-year AUD IRS rates to proxy. The maturities of IRS data are as follows. USD and JPY: 18-month, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year; EUR: 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year; AUD: 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year. Maturities vary for different currencies due to different payment frequencies of IRS rates and data availability. USD, JPY and AUD swap rates are paid semi-annually and EUR swap rates are paid annually.
Currency Swap Basis
Daily data of currency swap basis rates, including mid rate, pay rate and receive rate. Maturities are 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year. We have three pairs of currency swaps. For each pair, the left hand side (LHS) currency and the right hand side (RHS) currency are respectively EUR-USD, JPY-USD and AUD-USD.
FX option volatility smile
At-the-money volatility (ATMVOL), risk reversal (RR) and butterfly (BF ) provide us with three measures of FX market volatility. ATMVOL measures the market expectation of future volatility of underlying exchange rate, while RR and BF respectively measures the skewness and kurtosis of the volatility smile (Wystup, 2006) . We collect the most liquid 1-month ATMVOL, 25-delta RR and 25-delta BF data from Bloomberg.
Empirical Methodologies
Liquidity Basis
We calculate no-arbitrage bounds for forward rates and currency swaps and define the violation magnitude of bounds as liquidity basis. The maturities of liquidity basis include 1-month, 3-month and 6-month for forward rates and 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year for currency swaps. Notations are as follows:
X 0 : spot mid price of FOR-DOM at time 0; F (0,t) : forward mid price of FOR-DOM at time 0 with maturity t; X bid : spot bid price of FOR-DOM at time 0; X of f er : spot offer price of FOR-DOM at time 0; F bid(0,t) : forward bid price of FOR-DOM at time 0 with maturity t; F of f er(0,t) : forward offer price of FOR-DOM at time 0 with maturity t; r LIBOR(0,t) : domestic currency annual LIBOR rate between time 0 and t; r LIBID(0,t) : domestic currency annual LIBID rate between time 0 and t; r LIBOR(0,t) : foreign currency annual LIBOR rate between time 0 and t; r LIBID(0,t) : foreign currency annual LIBID rate between time 0 and t; τ (0,t) : year fraction of time 0 to t; Let [0, T ] be the term of the currency swap, i.e. time 0 is initiation and T is maturity. Also t i (i =1, 2 ,..., n, where t n = T ) denotes a pre-specified set of interest payment exchange dates, i.e. tenors.
Bounds for Forward Exchange Rates
In order to make riskless profit, an arbitrageur must engage in transactions simultaneously in both the domestic and the foreign market. The arbitrageur can borrow funds at domestic LIBOR, the strategy is as in Table 1 . 
Initiation
Maturity t borrow unit of domestic currency
and invest at r LIBID forward contract and lock in F bid
At maturity, to ensure no-arbitrage the net-cash flow must be non-positive,
Hence we have,
This is the upper bound for the bid price of the forward exchange rate. Alternatively, the arbitrageur can start from borrowing the foreign currency and the arbitrage strategy is as in Table 2 . 
The no-arbitrage condition requires that,
Hence we must have,
This is the lower bound for the offer price of the forward rate. We propose that bound (2) and (4) must hold to eliminate arbitrage opportunities.
Bounds for Basis of Currency Swaps
A generic currency swap is quoted as: LHS currency LIBOR + B / RHS currency LIBOR. B is the basis added to the LHS currency LIBOR. The pay rate BP is the price that a market maker (MM) is willing to pay when receiving the RHS currency LIBOR. The receive rate BR is the price that a MM receives when paying the RHS currency LIBOR. BR is always higher than BP and the difference is the profit for the MM. Let Y denote the RHS LIBOR-LIBID spread and Z denote the LHS LIBOR-LIBID spread. Assume that principal amount is 1 unit of RHS currency for 100 units of LHS currency (e.g. LHS is JPY and RHS is USD).
If one counterparty receives LHS LIBOR + BP and pays RHS LIBOR, then at initiation it receives the RHS principal 1 and pays the LHS principal 100. The LHS principal is borrowed at LHS LIBOR and the RHS principal is invested at RHS LIBID. The cash flows are summarized in Table 3 . We see that the principal amounts cancel and the net cash flow position at every tenor is (LHS principal * BP ) -(RHS principal * Y ). BP is a fixed quantity and conventionally Y is fixed at 12.5 basis points for all currencies quoted by British Banker Association (Coyle, 2001 ). The no arbitrage condition requires that the total present value (PV) of these cash flows must not be greater than zero. To properly discount we convert all cash flows to a common currency, say RHS currency and use RHS LIBID as the discount rate. We use LIBID because the arbitrageur should discount cash flows at the investment rate. The PV is calculated as,
In (5) d t i is the discount factor applicable between time 0 and t i .
is the price investors have to take when selling LHS for RHS in the forward market. We firstly solve,
for BP. Suppose BP 0 is the solution. By market convention, the spot mid rate X 0 at initiation is equal to the ratio of LHS principal over RHS principal, we hence simplify Eq. (6) as,
Solving Eq. (7) for BP 0 we obtain,
Because for any BP ≤ BP 0 the no-arbitrage condition holds, BP 0 is the upper bound for the basis pay rate. The upper bound has been derived by assuming Y is constant. If the spread is not fixed, the net position is exposed to uncertain cash flows. To eliminate this risk, we propose an alternative strategy. The counterparty can enter an IRS contract in the RHS currency. In this swap, the counterparty pays fixed RHS interest rate and receives RHS LIBOR. Let H denote the fixed rate of the IRS, cash flows are summarized in Table 4 . RHS LIBID in the net cash flow is uncertain. However we can view this series of cash flows as a floating rate bond without notional payment at maturity. Hence we know that the PV of this bond is RHS principal * (1 − d tn ). We thus eliminate the uncertainty and the PV of total net cash flows is,
Setting (9) equal to zero and solving for BP 0 we obtain,
The other counterparty of the swap pays LHS LIBOR + BR and receives RHS LIBOR. The cash flow position is in Table 5 . The no arbitrage condition is,
Because LHS principal and the sum of discount factors must be both positive, if Z is fixed at 12.5 bps, we must have,
Hence -12.5 bps is the lower bound for the basis receive rate. Alternatively, we can follow a similar IRS strategy if Z is not fixed. Assume the IRS swap fixed rate is G for the LHS currency, the lower bound would then be,
Discount Curves with LIBOR (LIBID) Rates
To test whether no-arbitrage bounds hold, we build two discount curves: one based upon LIBOR with IRS ask rates and the other upon the LIBID with IRS bid rates. We rewrite the forward exchange rate bounds (2) and (4) as,
where d LIBOR(0,t) (d LIBID(0,t) ) represents the foreign currency LIBOR (LI-BID) discount curve while d LIBOR(0,t) (d LIBID(0,t) ) represents the domestic currency LIBOR (LIBID) discount curve. We construct discount curves out to the 12-month maturity. Simply compounded LIBOR (LIBID) rates are firstly converted to continuously compounded rates,
The continuously compounded discount factor then is,
Discount Curves with Interest Rate Swap Rates
Discount curves beyond one year and out to five-year maturity are extracted from par swap rates. An IRS can be considered as a contract in which a coupon bearing bond is exchanged for a floating-rate bond (Brigo and Mercurio, 2006) . Because the initial value of an IRS must be zero to preclude arbitrage and floating-rate bonds always trade at par, the par swap fixed rate is simply the coupon rate for a par-value coupon bond. Assuming unit notional amount, swap fixed rate S t N must satisfy,
where F is the payment frequency of the swap rate and N is the total number of coupon payments. From Eq. (18) we obtain the final discount factor,
To apply Eq. (19), we need all discount factors and swap rates before the final maturity, i.e. from t 1 to t N −1 . We use the bootstrapping method with linear interpolation,
and work iteratively with Eq. (20) to obtain d t N .
Specifications of Model Variables
We follow Brunnermeier et al. (2008) and calculate the carry trade return in excess of the return predicted by UIP, hence the abnormal return. We use USD as the foreign currency in all three pairs. In each currency carry trade, USD is the funding currency. Hence funds are borrowed at the USD money market rate and invested at the EUR, JPY and AUD interest rates respectively. The daily excess return Z k t is thus,
In Eq. (21) S k t is the logarithm spot exchange rate at the end of day t for currency k and r k t−1 is the logarithm overnight money market rate at the end of day t − 1 for currency k. Hence the excess return is equal to the interest rate differential between currency k and USD locked in at the end of day t − 1, minus the return of the spot rate from day t − 1 to t. The term S k t − S k t−1 stands for the depreciation of currency k against USD. The UIP predicts that the interest rate differential r k t−1 − r U SD t−1 should be exactly offset by the depreciation of currency k, hence E t−1 (Z t ) = 0. The UIP puzzle arises from empirical observations that the abnormal return Z k t is often positive, i.e. investment currencies do not depreciate as much as predicted by UIP, instead in many cases they appreciate against the funding currency.
We conjecture that the liquidity bases of different maturities are closely related to each other because they are driven by some common liquidity events. These bases are not sufficiently independent of each other and from a statistical point of view, it is sensible to include all maturities in our empirical tests. Since there are 8 maturities, in order to reduce dimensionality we employ the principal component analysis (PCA) to transform these closely related variables into uncorrelated new variables.
Econometric Model
To test the effects of liquidity risk and volatility on the excess return of carry trades, we propose a linear factor autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model for each currency pair (i.e. USD/JPY, USD/EUR and USD/AUD),
where Z t is the abnormal return of carry trade between day t − 1 and t, IRDIF F t−1 is the overnight interest rate difference at the end of day t − 1 between the investment currency and USD, AT M V OL t , RR t and BF t are respectively the ATM volatility, 25-delta risk reversal and 25-delta butterfly at the end of day t for the 1-month FX option, quoted as USD/investment currency. Lastly, BS t is the liquidity basis based on PCA at the end of day t. We include one-day lags to account for potential autocorrelations in the exchange rates. The inclusion of lags in the regression model also enables us to capture both inertia of the dependent variable and contemporaneous effects. If the lags are significant, explanatory variables will also have some extent of predictive power for the exchange rate movement.
Compared to related literature (Brunnermeier et al., 2008, Ranaldo and
Söderlind, 2010), variables in our regression model may better proxy FXmarket liquidity risk and volatility. Firstly, ATM volatility, risk reversal and butterfly represent FX option market practitioners' expectations. Therefore they should better measure FX market volatility. Secondly, we replace TED spread with liquidity basis of forward exchange rates and currency swaps, which captures both market liquidity and funding liquidity risks specific to the FX market.
We make several hypotheses with respect to the effects of explanatory variables. Firstly, the effect of ATM volatility is negative if the investment currency on average depreciates against USD when FX market volatility increases. Secondly, risk reversal is negatively correlated with Z t because FX options in our study are quoted as USD/investment currency. If RR increases, then the USD call is more favored than the USD put, hence the market expects that the investment currency depreciates against the USD. Thirdly, we take an agnostic view on butterfly because higher BF indicates larger movements of exchange rates towards either direction. Fourthly, we expect that liquidity basis negatively impacts carry return if carry traders unwind positions when liquidity risk increases, hence suffering losses. Finally, after controlling for these factors, if IRDIF F is not significant in affecting carry returns, we may resolve the UIP puzzle.
The ADL model in Eq. (22) is used to test effects of explanatory variables for each individual currency pair. In order to control for individual currency heterogeneity we also construct panel data, which combine both time series of all variables in the ADL model and cross-sectional elements, namely three currency pairs. The panel technique we employ is the currency-fixed effects model.
Empirical Results
Liquidity Basis
We firstly calculate no-arbitrage bounds of 1-month, 3-month and 6-month forward rates and 1-5 year currency swap basis spreads with the formulae developed in the previous section 7 . Violations of no-arbitrage bounds are calculated as: 1) upper bound minus forward bid rate (currency swap basis pay rate) and 2) forward offer rate (currency swap basis receive rate) minus the lower bound. Negative results mean that bounds are violated and arbitrage opportunities are present. The findings are presented in Figures 1 to  6 for forward rates and in Figures 7 to 12 for currency swaps. For ease of illustration, only 1-year, 3-year and 5-year swaps are presented 8 .
In the forward market, we find that for both USD-EUR and USD-JPY currency pair, the upper bound of the forward bid rate holds strongly. The curves in Figures 1 and 3 were very stable before the GFC. From the second half of 2007 it has fluctuated but remained significantly positive. On the other hand, in Figures 2 and 4 the lower bound test shows almost a mirror image. Before the crisis, it held tightly. Starting from the crisis, the lower bound has been violated for most of the period. Fig.1-6 . Violations of no-arbitrage bounds of forward exchange rates. In Fig. 1, 3 and 5 the violations are calculated as the difference between the upper bound of the forward bid rate and the quoted forward bid rate. In Fig. 2, 4 and 6 the violations are calculated as the difference between the quoted forward offer rate and the lower bound of the forward offer rate. Positive parts of the graphs indicate that there are no arbitrage opportunities considering transaction costs. Negative parts of the graphs indicate that arbitrage opportunities are present in the forward market, after considering transaction costs. The bound violations contradict the no-arbitrage methodology in pricing forward rates and currency swaps. Clearly the persistence of the observed bound violations demonstrate that the market has not taken advantage of the apparent opportunities. We propose that the market is prevented from doing so by increased market imperfections, in particular the currency liquidity risk. These imperfections have developed in the forward and spot currency market since the GFC and result in forward and currency swap prices being determined by supply and demand pressures, rather than by arbitrage considerations.
In this study all forward rates are quoted as the price of one unit of USD, hence if supply exceeds demand, the market maker could buy the contract at a lower rate than the no-arbitrage level, hence the upper bound of the bid rate holds even tighter. On the other hand, the market maker can afford to sell at a level lower than the no-arbitrage lower bound. We therefore propose that the lower bound of the offer rate can be violated if supply exceeds demand. This implies demand for USD in the forward market is lower relative to the demand in the spot market, which is consistent with the USD liquidity risk. The USD funding shortage during the crisis faced by European and Japanese institutions has driven demand to secure USD in the spot market, hence the demand for USD is relatively lower in the forward market. On the other hand, the upper bound violations of the AUD forward bid rate indicate lower demand for USD in the spot market compared to the forward market, but higher demand for AUD in the spot market than in the forward market. This is also consistent with the observation that Australian banks do not have USD funding shortage and instead have high demand of AUD funding in international markets (Ossolinski and Zurawski, 2010) . The sup-ply/demand imbalance argument also applies in currency swaps. Since the crisis, in the currency swap market the demand for USD borrowing far exceeds demand for EUR and JPY, hence the lower bounds of EUR/USD and JPY/USD currency swap basis receive rates are substantially violated. The violation of the upper bound of AUD/USD currency swap basis pay rates implies that demand for AUD exceeds the demand for USD.
Standard theories in finance, such as Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross, 1976) , propose that arbitrageurs exploit violations of arbitrage free prices and noarbitrage equilibria should be quickly restored. However, under extreme market circumstances, arbitrage is risky and ineffective (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . We propose that liquidity risk is a plausible factor which may render arbitrage strategies ineffective. During the crisis, banks face a liquidity squeeze and are reluctant to make lending to LIBOR counterparties for longer than three months (Mollenkamp and Whitehouse, 2008). Table 6 shows the results of PCA based upon the correlation matrix for the liquidity basis. The first principal component explains 67.17%, 84.42% and 59.26% of total variance of liquidity basis for JPY, EUR and AUD respectively. The factor loadings on the first principal component all take positive values and are approximately equally weighted for maturities beyond one year. In order to reduce dimensionality and ease the interpretation, we take the first principal component as the common factor. In Table 7 we see that for the USD/JPY pair, all variables show large movements in level and standard deviation after the crisis. For example, the mean of the liquidity basis increased by 55 basis points. The standard deviation of the basis surged to more than 10 times its level before the crisis. Similarly, FX option market volatility variables: ATM volatility, butterfly and risk reversals, also significantly changed in both mean and standard deviation. The interest rate difference substantially decreased after the crisis, due to the stimulatory policies taken by the US Federal Reserve. The carry trade return on average has been profitable after the crisis, due to the much smaller interest rate difference and the substantial appreciation of JPY against USD.
Principal Component Analysis and Summary Statistics
The results are similar in the EUR and AUD summary statistics. The standard deviation of EUR liquidity basis increased about 25 times after the crisis, and about 10 times for AUD basis. FX option volatility measures in both currencies demonstrate much greater variations. In all three currency pairs, most of the variables experienced greater kurtosis, reflecting large market movements and heightened uncertainties since the crisis. Finally, the Jarque-Bera normality tests show that for all the variables (except EUR risk reversal and AUD liquidity basis), the hypothesis of normal distribution is rejected, both before and after the crisis.
The summary statistics clearly show different dynamics of the variables before and after the crisis, which provide us with further motivation to investigate if there exist structural changes. 
Unit Root Tests
We perform the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test of unit roots. The tests are taken on both level and first difference of the variables, before and after the crisis. Results are presented in Table 10 . The null hypothesis is that the variable has a unit root. The lag length of the test is determined by Schwarz information criterion (SIC) and the probabilities of test statistics are reported. Table 10 shows that the first differences of all variables are stationary, which is expected for financial time-series data. The carry trade returns are found to be I(0). However, some independent variables are shown to be I(1) at 5% significance level. For example, ATM volatility for all three currencies. The liquidity basis is I(0) only for AUD before the crisis. Taking the first differences of the I(1) variables would avoid the problem of non-stationarity. However, the ADL model aims to capture both the lagged and contemporaneous effects. We therefore choose to use levels of each variable in the regressions. Nevertheless, to address the non-stationarity issue, we will perform robustness checks later in section 4.6. 
Factor Model Regression Results
Results of the ADL model regression for each currency pair are presented in Table 11 , 12 and 13. We firstly run the model for the full sample period. To find if there is a structural break before and after the crisis, we use the Chow Breakpoint Test to identify if parameters are stable over the whole period, with August 10th, 2007 as the break date. Test results 10 show that the break date is supported for JPY and EUR, but not for AUD. As we discussed earlier, AUD reacted to the GFC later than JPY and EUR. Figure 13 Table 11 results show that in the USD/JPY carry trade, the excess return is significantly negatively correlated with the previous day return. For the post-crisis period, as the interest rate difference between JPY and USD increases, carry return is expected to increase. There is no significance found on IRDIF F for the full period and pre-crisis period. ATM volatility has a significant positive contemporaneous effect on carry return, but this is largely reversed on the next day. Risk reversal is significant for all three periods. As the risk reversal increases, which implies the USD call is placed with a higher volatility than USD put, the carry return of the same day decreases, the effect is almost offset during the following day. Butterfly is significantly negative, but only for the before crisis period. The liquidity basis is only significant for the before crisis period. In both the butterfly and liquidity basis, the one-day lags are not significant.
The EUR regression results in Table 12 show a similar negative effect of the previous day carry return. The interest-rate difference between EUR and USD is insignificant in all three regressions. The ATM volatility effect is only significant before the crisis. The effect of risk reversal is the same as that of JPY. Butterfly is not at all significant. Liquidity basis is not significant before the crisis. However after the crisis its contemporaneous effect on carry return is significantly negative, indicating the pressure of liquidity risk on carry trade performance.
In Table 13 , the effect of previous day carry return between AUD and USD is same as the JPY and EUR counterparts. The interest-rate differential is significantly negative after the crisis, but insignificant before the crisis. The ATM volatility effect is significant for all regressions and the reverse effect also is present. However, different from JPY and EUR, the contemporaneous effect of ATM volatility is negative. The findings on risk reversal are the same as JPY and EUR. Butterfly is significant only for the lagged value before the crisis. Similar to EUR, the liquidity basis of AUD is not significant before the crisis, but the effect is significantly negative after the crisis.
We discuss several important findings in the results presented above. Firstly, except for JPY and AUD in the post crisis period, the interest-rate differential at the end of day t − 1 is not significant in explaining the carry trade excess return at the end of day t. This points to a potential resolution of the UIP puzzle, in which the the interest-rate difference has predictive power for the excess return. Secondly, in general the significant factors show the reverse effect on the following day. The lags typically have opposite signs and magnitudes of the coefficients between t and t − 1 are very close. The firstorder autoregressive model (AR(1)) estimates show that AT M V OL, RR, BF and BS all demonstrate high first-order autocorrelation. As pointed out in Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010) , this implies if there is no innovation in these terms, the effect on day t − 1 would be largely reversed on day t. The significance of the lag terms shows some degree of predictive power of these factors. Thirdly, our newly proposed liquidity risk proxy, the liquidity basis, is highly significant for EUR and AUD.
Panel Regression Results
The individual currency regression results of the ADL model show that the liquidity basis is not significant in the USD/JPY carry trade. This is possibly driven by fundamental differences across currencies. For example, Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010) find that JPY possesses "safe haven" properties. Safehaven currencies provide hedging benefits during market stress periods. The sharp appreciation of JPY since the GFC offers further support for the haven status of JPY. On the other hand, there is no significant evidence that EUR is a safe-haven currency and AUD generally represents investors' risk appetite. In order to control for currency individual heterogeneity and identify common structures, we test the ADL model with the balanced panel data with currency-fixed effects. The results are summarized in Table 14 .
We see in Table 14 that after controlling for currency specific effects, the interest-rate difference is not significant in predicting carry trade excess return, both before and after the crisis. This suggests that the UIP puzzle may be explained after accounting for the effects of FX market volatility and liquidity risk. ATM volatility is insignificant before the crisis, but highly significant after the crisis. Risk reversal is highly significant both before and after the crisis. Butterfly is only significant before the crisis. Lastly, since the crisis the liquidity basis is highly significant. The R 2 increases from 26.32% before the crisis to 35.66% after the crisis, which shows that the break date is reasonably chosen. 
Robustness Check
Unit root tests in section 4.3 show that some independent variables are I(1).
To address the non-stationarity problem, we estimate both individual currency regressions and the panel regression with the first-differenced values of these variables 11 . Regression results are largely unchanged. For all significant variables in previous regressions, the first-differenced terms are still significant. Even more promisingly, the previously significant interest-rate differentials for JPY and AUD in the post crisis period are no longer significant. Therefore the case for the resolution of the UIP puzzle is even stronger.
Conclusion
This paper provides empirical support for a liquidity-risk based model to 11 Detailed results are available upon requests.
explain the UIP puzzle. We study the effects of liquidity risk and market volatility on the carry trade excess returns. We develop an alternative proxy for FX-market liquidity risk -the violations of no-arbitrage bounds for forward exchange rates and currency basis swaps. We also propose FX market specific volatility proxies. Our hypothesis is that both proxies should be significant in explaining carry trade performance and hence useful for a resolution of the UIP puzzle.
The sample is chosen to cover periods both before and after the GFC in order to capture the structural break. A linear factor model is proposed and tested for both individual currencies and the panel data. Our hypothesis is supported by test results and both proxies are significant. The results are also robust to different specifications of explanatory variables.
We contribute to the extant literature from three perspectives. Firstly, our liquidity risk proxy captures both market liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk. Secondly, we demonstrate that the risk factors change their effects since the GFC. Lastly, we provide significant evidence that the UIP puzzle may be resolved after controlling for liquidity risk and market volatility.
There are two ways in which future research can build upon this study. Firstly, we use high-frequency daily data. It will be interesting to see if results in this study hold for lower-frequency data, such as weekly or quarterly data. Secondly, since the GFC liquidity risk can no longer be assumed negligible, models which embed the liquidity basis should be developed to properly price and hedge FX market contracts.
